

~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA / WIND 691206



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 6 December 1969

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

For the President Only


~~Top Secret~~

SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968 - 1969


weekly average for each month

1968 1969





OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1969



weekly data as reported*





US BATTLE DEATHS increased from the previous week's very low 70 to 102 for this week.





SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS also increased considerably from the 291 of last week to a reported 396 this week. The official total may vary as late reports are received, but still will be considerably lower than the figure released to the press by the GVN for the period.





INFILTRATORS ENTERING PIPELINE increased as three battalion size and two unknown size groups were detected along with evidence that other groups are on the move. Since late October, some 11,500 have been identified in the pipeline with another 7,500-8,500 possible.



ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS rose sharply from the 513 of last week to 717 this week. Light attacks by fire occurred on 2-3 December and 5-6 December. The enemy continued to avoid large unit contact.



ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION increased from the previous week's 2,177 to this week's 2,469.




SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS as measured by percentage of total enemy killed by the SVN increased significantly from the previous week's 45% of enemy killed to this week's 54%.

*Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary. South Vietnamese battle death figures, for instance, commonly show major upward changes.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

The past week was characterized by increased casualties on both sides as light enemy indirect fire attacks and limited ground probes continued. Numerous enemy losses resulted when his forces were caught by the Allies while apparently preparing for future attacks. Evidence is mounting that the enemy still intends "high points" of localized military action featuring limited artillery and sapper attacks against isolated Allied positions during the first half of December. 25X1B



South Vietnamese Political Developments

Cease-fire

President Thieu has informed Ambassador Bunker that he would be most reluctant to make a cease-fire proposal at this time. He recognizes that at some point our side might take the initiative, but states that any cease-fire proposal must be a serious offer. It must include concrete steps such as international supervision and verification, regroupment, and possibly some political elements. Withdrawal was not listed as a necessary element since he feels that after a cease-fire the U.S. could use its presence to obtain mutual withdrawal. Thieu feels that unless these conditions were made part of the offer, our side might be placed on the defensive by an enemy move to accept a cease-fire in principle, but hinged to conditions which we would have to reject. He is willing to cooperate, however, if President Nixon felt it necessary to propose an early cease-fire.

Prospects for Political Mobilization

The senior CIA official in Vietnam reports that the GVN has made significant progress over the past year in the Vietnamization program, pacification, and in other areas vital to its security. It has, however, had only limited success in mobilizing the country's fragmented political groups into a cohesive anti-Communist force. In attempting to build up his political base, President Thieu is placing major emphasis on gaining the loyalty of the large corps of military, civil servants, and local officials, rather than on the existing political parties which have little grass roots support. He is convinced that he can acquire greater public support and more votes by effectively implementing his Vietnamization, pacification, and economic programs. Thus, while Thieu does not intend to abandon completely his support of the pro-government political groups, the prospects for any meaningful mobilization of the country's political structure over the next six months are not promising.

~~Top Secret~~